sociologists, or any kind of anthropologist. , ) remains to this day a central point of reference for all social scientists: be they social psychologists, social historians. “Une Catégorie de L'Esprit Humain: La Notion de Personne Celle de “Moi”.” The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland 68: 263–281. Marcel Mauss’ classic essay on the person (1938 Mauss, Marcel.

Thus, I deny that the concept of truth could have evolved for instrumental reasons such as solving problems, or through self-questioning about what one ought to believe. Thereby, I suggest that the binary structure of the truth value underlying any declarative sentence is founded on disagreements based on conflicts of interest. According to my proposal, the first declarative sentence (articulated in a simple sign language) emerged as a negation of a negation of an implicit statement expressed by the display of an indexical object referring to a past action. In this paper I extend this view to the origin of the concept of truth. The view developed in this paper is broadly consistent with the argumentative theory of Mercier and Sperber, which suggests that reasoning is less adapted to decision making than to social purposes such as winning disputes or justifying one’s actions. I show that the display of an indexical object (such as the display of hunting trophies) can imply a conceptual structure similar to that informing the syntax of sentences. Applied to the emergence of declarative sentences, this suggests something already existing-natural signs (which have a logical or causal relation to what they denote)-were used for the declarative function and thereby integrated (in the form of indexical objects implying a past action) into communication. The second is the function-first approach to explaining the evolution of traits: before a prototype of a new trait develops and the adaptation process begins, something already existing is used for a new purpose. The first is known as the social intelligence hypothesis: that the cognitive evolution of humans is first and foremost an adaptation to social demands. Such a proposal is based on two assumptions. This paper proposes a social account for the origin of the truth value and the emergence of the first declarative sentence.

Letras invisibles